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CHAPTER ONE 
Poland's Ex--Communists: From 
Pariahs to Establishment Players 
Jane Leftwich Curry 
The Polish United Workers' Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza 
[PZPR]) suffered what seemed to be a terminal blow in 1989. In elections 
rigged so that the communists and their old allies were guaranteed 65 percent 
of the seats in the main house of parliament, the communists did so badly 
that their old allies deserted them. After what appeared to be a total defeat, 
all the communist reformers could do was turn the government over to the 
men and women of Solidarity they had interned and harassed for more than 
a decade. Then they had to disband themselves and form a new party to in-
herit the tattered remains of their mantle and resources. Less than four years 
after what looked like a complete rejection, in the 1993 free parliamentary 
elections, the successor party to the PZPR, the Social Democrats of Poland 
(Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej [SdRP]), and its coalition, the 
Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej [SLD]), did well 
enough to dominate the parliament and form a government. Two years later, 
in 1995, the leader of the SdRP and its coalition's presidential candidate, 
Aleksander Kwasniewski (a junior member of that last communist govern-
ment), soundly defeated the Solidarity leader and incumbent president, Lech 
WaX~sa. By 1999, when the coalition turned itself into a party, the SLD was, 
by far, both the most popular and the most stable party in democratic Poland. 
As a result, it dominated the parliamentary elections of 2001, leaving Soli-
darity's old parties so fragmented that they did not get enough of the votes to 
get seats. In the process, it raised the population's hopes that it could solve 
Poland's economic problems and bring the same economic boom Poles re-
membered from 1993 to 1997 . 
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From ignominious defeat to what seemed to be ever-increasing popularity, 
the social democrats had transformed themselves, their ideology, ~nd their 
public image. They went from an unpopular ruling communist party to a suc-
cessful player in democratic and capitalist Poland. As their continued gains 
at all levels have proved, this was not an accident. It reflected the fact that 
the "new" successor party was the party that, in form if not in ideology, did 
what appealed to voters. Its successes haunted the other parties of Poland-
triggering attempts at political revenge that ended up distorting post-
communist Poland's politics and its ideological spectrum. 
This is the story of how the social democrats transformed themselves from 
the hammer and sickle of Marx and Lenin (however much it had been kept 
in the background during the waning years of communism) to a party sym-
bolized by a single red rose and, finally, by a red and white S (a modernist ver-
sion of the symbol of its decades-old opponent, the independent trade-union 
movement, Solidarity). It is a critical tale of democratic transformation and 
also a cautionary tale for those who thought they understood what commu-
nism was all about. In the end, though, it is a demonstration of how lessons 
of a rejected past and the desire to be accepted by other politicians can play 
a major role in determining how a party transforms. 
The story begins with the outpouring of opposition to the PZPR that showed 
up in the partially free elections of 1989. The redesign and return of the former 
communists to power in Polish politics began as a reaction to the shock of this 
defeat and the bitterness generated among new politicians by the communists' 
continued presence in the government bureaucracy and, as a minority, in the 
parliament. They were defeated in 1989 but not totally vanquished. So, they 
were easy to blame for Poland's problems. The story then moves from the at-
tempts to build on the rubble and resources of the once ruling communist party 
to the founding of the Social Democratic Party of Poland and the formation of 
an electoral coalition that tied together the SdRP, the old government trade 
union (Og6lnopolskie Porozumienie Zwiazk6w Zawodowych/All Poland Trade 
Union Coalition [OPZZ]) , and an odd assortment of small parties and interest 
groups. Then, in 1999, it ends when the SdRP disbanded itself, and the SLD 
coalition turned into a sleek new party designed to avoid the pitfalls of the old 
coalition, to leave the taint of "communism" behind, and to reclaim national 
leadership in the 2001 parliamentary elections. 
The Prelude 
Poland's communist party, the Polish United Workers' Party, was always a 
"special case," not just when it negotiated itself out of power but throughout 
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its history. It simply never was as "in control" as were communist parties else-
where in the Soviet bloc. Even before de-Stalinization, communism in 
Poland repressed the Catholic Church and internal party dissidents less than 
in other Soviet-bloc systems. Reformists from within and popular revolts 
from without kept the party unstable for most of its forty-five years of rule . 
After the workers' strikes in Poznan and the liberalization of the "Polish 
October" that followed in 1956, the "Polish Road to Socialism" went in the 
direction of private farming, more private industry and trade than anywhere 
else but Yugoslavia, and relative autonomy for the Catholic Church to teach 
religion and play a real role in political decisions. Over all this was an ideo-
logical veneer that did little to hide the party's own cynicism and reformist 
impulses. 
With the Poznan workers' demonstrations and the Polish October of 1956, 
Poland and its communist party began a never-ending cycle of popular up-
heavals and party reactions. The worker demonstrations and strikes of 1956, 
1970, and 1976 all resulted in repression and then at least momentary com-
promises with workers' demands. In the process, Poland opened up more and 
more to the West. In the 1970s, this openness involved not just scholarly and 
intellectual exchanges and tourism but also a policy of improving the econ-
omy by opening up for imports and exports from the West. The intellectual 
demonstrations in 1968, on the other hand, had resulted in repression and 
then a purging of the party and an anti-Semitic purge of both party and gov-
ernment.1 
Finally, the shipyard workers' strikes in August 1980 resulted in the for-
mation of "Solidarity," the first independent and legal trade-union move-
ment in Eastern Europe since before World War II. By this time, though, 
Poland's economy was teetering, and the pattern of protest, repression, and 
compromise had worn down the party. Not only were Poland's party leaders 
ready to negotiate with the Solidarity strikers, but they also were ready to al-
low, for fifteen months, Solidarity to be a major actor in Polish politics. Dur-
ing this time, Solidarity had a membership of more than one-third of the Pol-
ish population. There was a virtually free press, with more open discussions 
in the establishment press and a plethora of Solidarity papers printed inde-
pendently; there was also an upheaval in the PZPR that led to an "Extraor-
dinary Party Congress" where old leaders were voted out. 
After fifteen months of internal protest and Soviet pressure, the Polish 
leadership under Wojciech Jaruzelski declared martial law on December 
13, 1981, interning Solidarity's leaders, intellectual critics of the regime, 
and the leaders of the PZPR from the 1970s. 2 Martial law essentially froze 
political change for the first half of the 1980s and left the society bitterly 
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split and those party members who did not leave the PZPR in protest iso-
lated. 3 By the end of the 1980s, it was clear to both the party leaders and 
most of the old Solidarity leadership that the stalemate could not con-
tinue. The informal contacts between the establishment and the opposi-
tion that had gone on in the 1980s were turned into a public roundtable 
in 1989 that initially was aimed at setting up a new system whereby Soli-
darity would be included but not "in power" and the two sides could work 
toward opening up the system. Out of this came accords that were to pro-
tect workers' interests, allow Solidarity to be a legal player in politics, 
open up the press, lead to partially free elections for the legislature (Sejm), 
and change the system so that there was a freely elected second house, the 
Senate, and a president who was to be elected by the two houses. Six 
weeks after the accords were signed, the old Soviet bloc's first even par-
tially free elections were held. 
These elections, designed to begin a limited "power sharing" with the op-
position, actually ended in a shocking defeat for the communists. The elec-
tion had been planned so that the communists and their allies would be 
guaranteed 65 percent of the seats in the Sejm (the lower house of parlia-
ment) and would compete against nonparty candidates only for seats in the 
newly organized upper house, the Senate. In the first round of the election, 
virtually none of the "party" candidates won a majority. Even the few who 
"won" a majority in this round did not win a traditional victory: the party 
had required only twenty-five signatures for a candidate to get a place on its 
ballots. Most candidates campaigned with as little mention of their party 
connection as possible. For those who had to run in a second round, victory 
was often a result of Solidarity intervening to urge voters to vote again and 
to vote for a specific "regime" candidate as the best of a bad lot. In simulta-
neous elections for the one hundred Senate seats, the communist candidates 
lost all but one seat. Finally, in what was to be a "guaranteed" election for 
Communist Party leaders running on the National List with no opposition, 
most voters crossed off all or most of the candidates' names. Only the two 
listed at the bottom of the list ( where, presumably, single Xs over the whole 
list simply did not reach) got enough votes to win. The results were such a 
debacle for the regime that the Peasant Party and Democratic Party, loyal to 
the Communist Party through four decades of communist rule, bolted from 
this "sinking ship." They went into a coalition with the victorious Solidar-
ity opposition, leaving communist reformers with too little support to form 
a governing coalition. 
Solidarity, at the same time, shifted from being a trade union to being a 
governing party. In that form, the former trade union imposed "shock ther-
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apy" economic reforms that brought hardships to most Poles and left many 
Solidarity supporters feeling betrayed by their national leaders. Among the 
men and women who had believed the roundtable promises that social wel-
fare would be protected in Poland, there was a real des ire to find advocates 
for the return and preservation of social welfare. 
In dealing with the past, the first Solidarity government advocated "draw-
ing a thick line" between the past and the present. But, less than six months 
after they had turned over power, Communist Party members and leaders 
found themselves and the communist past subject to public criticism and at-
tacks on "the party" and its rule. To these critic isms, the party leadership and 
its Sejm delegation had no real response. Most Sejm deputies had run aga inst 
their ties to the party. Once elected, deputies who had been in the party were 
treated as pariahs by other deputies. The party's reformist leaders, who would 
have led them, were out of power. They had, essentially, been ousted in what 
seemed a full -scale rejection of the national party list. 
Furthermore, the party had no agreed-on direction. There was no clear 
party agenda for the election . After all , regime candidates ran against each 
other, not against the opposition's candidates. Each candidate ran his own 
campaign, promoting himself aga inst opponents who were also from the 
PZPR. What the PZPR platform officially promised was that the system would 
be "more democratic." In the campaign, the party simply identified itself as 
"realizing the ideals of the working class as the party of working people which 
had and was going to have no other program than serving the nation."4 
The shock of Solidarity 's victory was so overwhelming that it swept 
PZPR deputies into joining Solidarity's full- scale assault on the old system. 
Party deput ies set aside many of the promises of the roundtab le. The polit-
ical changes they supported went much further to diminish commun ist 
power than anyone had expected. As a result, those elected as PZPR rep-
resen tatives were left without constituencies. At the local level , the party 
essentially crumbled . Members who had joined the party to get ahead pro-
fessionally were no longer in terested in it because it now hurt rather than 
he lped their careers. Those who had supported the old system were alien-
ated by PZPR deput ies' votes fo r the Balcerowicz Plan of economic shock 
therapy and also fo r political reforms made to end the communist system. 
By the end of the year, the PZPR group in the Sejm had essen t ially dis-
solved into small groups that eschewed any direct identification with the 
communist party: a "military group," the "unaffiliated deput ies group," a 
"democratic left group," and a "soc ialist group. "5 
The men who had been the party 's leaders either left politics or commit-
ted themselves, in fa ll 1989, to establishing a new political party that could 
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make use of the resources the party still had. Working from the top, these 
leaders called an extraordinary congress to dissolve the party and to form a 
new one. By design, it was to distance itself from the past and focus on social 
democratic goals. These, they hoped, would draw not only former Commu-
nist Party members but also new supporters. Even party intellectuals did lit-
tle real ideological rethinking as to "What next?" The rethinking that did 
happen was done in spontaneous groups formed in summer 1989, at univer-
sities in Warsaw and Krakow. They concluded then that the old party was 
finished but went no further.6 
Many party bureaucrats had seen the "writing on the wall" even before the 
election debacle. Those with marketable skills and connections had been 
taking other positions for years. In moving from party posts, they often cam-
ouflaged their party past. The rest of them were trapped. Their situations 
were so difficult, even before communism had been defeated, that the PZPR 
Organizational Department published a book in 1988 touting party bureau-
crats' training and skills as managers and specialists. At the same time, PZPR 
leaders quietly shifted money to other accounts and to investments in vari-
ous enterprises that were to cover the unemployment and retirement for 
those party bureaucrats who could not find employment after the party dis-
solved. 
In 1989, when the first "noncommunist" government since World War II 
was formed, the communists got three key cabinet posts ( the Ministries of In-
terior, Defense, and Transportation) . Their appointments, like Wojciech 
Jaruzelski's election by a bare majority of the parliament to the presidency, 
were justified as something the Soviet Union required in order to accept 
Poland's transformation out of communist rule. Without the support of a 
panoply of party ministers and top administrators, the government bureau-
crats who had gotten their positions in ministries through the communist-era 
nomenklatura system of appointment were essentially persona non grata. 
Most were kept in their positions because they had the expertise the new 
government needed and because there were few others who wanted to join 
the government's bureaucracies. The new Solidarity ministers made it clear 
that these men and women of the nomenklatura were neither trusted nor 
needed. So the old bureaucrats, who knew how the system worked, laid low 
to avoid drawing attention to themselves. 
It was the party loyalists in the local party bodies who felt the attacks 
first . Local party members were scoffed at or assaulted. Many party head-
quarters were robbed or attacked. Newspapers were suddenly filled with crit-
icism of "the party." According to their own reports, most members either 
wanted to forget they had ever been in the party or were outraged their lead-
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ers had totally deserted them. Some local organizat ions tried to get credi-
bility by "sharing their wealth"-their extra telephones, faxes, and mimeo-
graph machines-with local schools, hospitals, and youth centers. 7 Many, 
among the party faithful, were angry with their old leaders for handing over 
power to the "Solidarity" enemy without protecting them. They also felt ig-
nored by "their" Sejm deputies who were so focused on being reformers, sur-
viv ing the defeat of their old party, and caught up in activity in the capital 
that they did not come back to their constituencies. Even their party mem-
bership was an embarrassment. To many, all it seemed to do was trigger at-
tacks. At the same time, it was clear to the old party members that they were 
unwelcome anywhere else. 
By January 1990, the system and the party had reached the point of no re-
turn. Even though Sejm deputies elected on the PZPR list had voted for all 
the new government's reforms, the public blame for just about everything was 
placed on "the party." Attacks and revelations about its "evil" past became a 
staple of the new media, and some Solidarity politicians went further. Legis-
lation was passed allowing PZPR assets to be investigated and then se ized (if 
not directly traceable to party members' dues and collections). Accounting 
commissions were set up to reclaim the state assets shifted to Communist 
Party coffers over the years. So, fo r instance, the giant press concern the 
party had controlled, R.S.W. Prasa, had its assets broken up, sold, or given to 
private publ ishers. This was the beginning of the PZPR's loss of all but a lim-
ited number of its buildings and accounts. Some in the new regime went fur-
ther. They called for fo llowing the Czech and East German pattern of "de-
communization" by removing from public positions all party officials and 
others who had held positions in party bodies as well as those who had 
worked for the secret police. All this heightened the fear and powerlessness 
of local party officials and people from the party. 
As these attacks escalated, the PZPR announced and held what was pre-
sented, from the start, as its final congress. The groundwork had been laid by 
top national leaders of the PZPR to establish a successor party, which would 
represent "social democratic goals" but not reject the party's remaining assets 
or its past. Another, smaller group of leaders and most of the Sejm deputies 
from the PZPR ticket had already taken a more radical position. They with-
drew from the PZPR and created the Polish Social Democratic Union (Polska 
Unia Socjaldemokratyczne [PUS]) in fa ll 1989 before the final party congress 
was even held. Their new party advocated the establishment of a social wel-
fare state but separated itself totally from the "ill-gotten gains" of the PZPR.8 
It was led by Tadeusz Fiszbach , the fo rmer Gdansk Party leader who had be-
come close to the Solidarity leaders in the early 1980s. In the ensuing fight 
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over what to establish and how, PUS stayed away from all that was tied to 
the PZPR. It ignored local party organizations. At the same time, the old top 
party leaders who wanted to protect the PZPR's legacy made their first forays 
back to local party meetings and tried to get commitments for· support for the 
new party from people elected as delegates to the national congress. 
When the congress opened in January 1990, there was a day of short 
speeches about the party's reformist past,9 a playing out of old party rituals, a 
formal vote to disband the PZPR, and an announcement that delegates 
should adjourn to one of two adjoining rooms, either to the first session of 
the Social Democratic Party of the Polish Republic or to the session of the 
Polish Union of Socialists. The other option many party congress delegates 
took was simply to walk out the door and join nothing. 10 
In the end, the SdRP emerged as an awkward coalition of PZPR reformist 
leaders, a minority of the PZPR parliamentary deputies elected in 1989, and 
the local party aktiv who had nowhere else to go. There was no common ide-
ology. The old party leaders essentially organized this transition and left the 
scene (or were simply ignored). The deputies to the Sejm who had voted for 
the economic reforms and the removal of the Communist Party from power 
were in a quandary. They had made their statement against the old Commu-
nist Party but then were welcomed into none of the new parties. So their 
only option was to join the SdRP. Local activists who joined the SdRP were, 
most often, conservatives opposed to the reforms supported by the PZPR 
deputies. But, again, if they wanted to belong to something, the SdRP and 
PUS were the only parties that would accept them. PUS, though, openly de-
cried the party's heritage, wealth, and power, so it was not as safe a haven. 
What the SdRP had going for it was an infrastructure, experience in organ-
izing, and a tradition of members sticking with and working for the party. Their 
loyalty was further cemented by what seemed to be overwhelming anticom-
munism in the rest of the society. From the start, all this had made the social 
democrats a lightening rod for attacks on the communist past and the power 
anticommunists claimed it still had. These attacks, in tum, made even the 
most "Leninist" former communists see the SdRP as the only real defender for 
party members. So, no matter what liberal policies the new party supported, 
the old party "hacks" were sure to vote for it. 
The Polish Social Democratic Union was supported by a majority of 
Sejm deputies and intellectuals from the "7th of July Movement" at the 
University of Warsaw and its equivalent discussion group in Krakow. For 
them, being connected with the old Communist Party was also nothing but 
a disadvantage. Their strategic problem was that, when they made reject-
ing the "ill-gotten gains" of the old PZPR and support for Solidarity's 
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painful economic reforms a major part of their program, they were left with 
no resources to build their party and no way to differentiate themselves 
from Solidarity parties. After all, supporting the economic and political re-
forms alienated party members and the losers in the economic transition. 
Refusing to take the PZPR's "ill-gotten gains" alienated activists bound up 
with the PZPR and left the PUS with no resources. But, no matter how it 
marketed itself, PUS remained "communist" in the public's mind. The only 
saving grace was that it was truly invisible: the media and Solidarity politi-
cians focused on Solidarity's victories and the demise of the old commu-
nists they identified with the SdRP. 
The Miracle: The Rise to the Top 
After the Rubicon of 1989 had been crossed the former communists looked as 
though they had no future at all. Solidarity and post-Solidarity parties fixated 
on attacking the communists and their past as a central element of their plat-
forms. Ironically, out of these experiences, the SdRP developed its winning 
ideology, organization, and tactics. The miracle was that, out of what seemed 
near-total defeat and rejection, the new party formed a coalition, the SLD, 
which would succeed in dominating the democratic landscape for the next 
decade and beyond. True, the successive elections held during 1990 and 1991 · 
· were all disasters for the former communists. But the SdRP survived and had 
few defections, with none from its leadership, whereas, less than four years af-
ter the PZPR had disbanded itself, the other post-communist party (PUS) was 
dead. Meanwhile, along with a host of parties that broke off from their Soli-
darity base, a noncommunist left party emerged, but it was never really able 
to capture either the votes of former communists or the loyalty of "losers" from 
Poland's dramatic economic reforms. It was after this period that the SdRP-
backed coalition was able to use the lessons and remaining resources of its "old 
days" and begin its "winning streak." 
In the 1990 local elections, the former communists were virtually invisi-
ble. The few candidates identified with the SdRP did very poorly. PUS did 
not run any candidates because it was so strapped for resources and focused 
on its work in the Sejm. Because no candidate could run without a party af-
filiation, most former communist candidates disguised their past communist 
ties and ran under new, fake party labels. In the end, this meant that, even 
when communists did well, it was impossible to measure the party's support 
and equally hard to deny that this first truly free election had been a total dis-
aster for the former communists. Specifically identified Social Democratic 
Party candidates got 2. 7 percent of the vote, losing in all the major regions 
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of the country. Even counting the fake parties created by the communists, es-
timates of the total vote for all those connected with communism are no 
more than 6 to 7 percent. 11 Not only was this another public sign of weak-
ness, but it left the successors without the hold on local jobs and privileges 
that had brought support in earlier years. The new rulers took over and 
cleansed their local administrations of "communists," giving jobs to Solidar-
ity supporters. 
In the wake of this debacle, Lech WaX~sa's supporters began a petition 
campaign for Jaruzelski to resign from the presidency. By the end of 1990, he 
had resigned after being a major figure in Poland for more than thirty years 
as head of the Polish military, first secretary of the PZPR, prime minister dur-
ing martial law and after, and then the man who had governed during 
Poland's exit from communist rule. His resignation seemed to many to be the 
ultimate renunciation of the past. 
For the presidential election to fill Jaruzelski's position in fall 1990, the 
SdRP formed a coalition of real or "imagined" leftist parties, social organi-
zations, and trade unions. This was the coalition that would return election 
after election for the next decade. SdRP leaders were so "gun-shy" of an-
other massive defeat that none of them ran. Instead, they supported the 
candidacy of WXodzimierz Cimoszewicz, a former PZPR member who 
headed the self-declared leftist group in the parliament and had not joined 
any of the new parties. In the campaign that followed, he, former commu-
nists, and their successor party were marginal to the public battles. The 
campaign avoided the old stereotypes by portraying him as a legal scholar 
and middle-class peasant. 12 
Cimoszewicz's campaign, like the coalition that supported him, was a re-
sponse to the unpopularity of the images of the old communist movement. It 
emphasized noncommunist things: his legal professionalism, middle-class 
life, and connections to one of the poorer and least "communist" sections of 
Poland, Bial'ystok. His campaign did not even mention a return to state wel-
fare. Instead, it stressed the normalcy of a market economy and called only 
for a more generous social welfare policy. This was a prototype of future so-
cial democratic campaigns. No matter how much voters were hurt by the 
economic reforms and wanted to return to the social guarantees and eco-
nomic benefits of the communist regime, the social democrats were too con-
cerned about not being tarred as being "still communists" to advocate for so-
cial welfare or to criticize the economic reforms. They dealt with the past 
simply by avoiding anything that would look "communist." 
In the election, Cimoszewicz drew 9.21 percent of the electorate by 
drawing votes from people in all social groups except those who defined 
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themselves as "religious." As would remain the case for the SdRP and its 
SLD coalition, his strongholds were the smaller cities and towns hurt most 
in the economic reforms and the "workers" in the communist apparatus 
and government bureaucracies. 13 His vote put him fourth of six candidates 
in the first round: he came after Solidarity hero Lech Waf (!sa (39.96 per-
cent); the incumbent prime minister and Solidarity intellectual Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki (18.08 percent); and "dark horse" Canadian businessman Stan 
Tyminski (23.1 percent). At the same time, he was ahead of the Peasant 
Party leader, Roman Bartoszcze (7.15 percent), and the anticommunist 
group leader, Leszek Moczulski (2.5 percent). 14 
PUS, on the other hand, took what proved to be a suicidal stance. It did 
not join the coalition or run a candidate. Instead, the party stayed out of the 
election. Its leader, who had been head of the Gdansk Party during the Sol-
idarity era, gave his support to his friend, Lech Waf (!sa. This neither bene-
fited Waf(!sa nor gave PUS a public presence. 
The 1991 parliamentary elections were called early by Solidarity groups to 
"cleanse the system of its old communist representatives." In a continuation 
of the process of responding to attacks and trying to prove they were not 
communists, the SdRP and its coalition produced a platform that did not re-
flect the frustration and fury of their natural elect~rate, those who had lost 
in the initial, drastic shock of Poland's "shock therapy" transformation of the 
economy. They walked a fine line, avoiding taking a negative approach to ei-
ther the communist system or the new noncommunist, capitalist system. As 
a result, their platform, from the beginning, did not truly stand for anything 
or propose any policy alternatives. Instead, it criticized those who attacked 
communism for ignoring the work and achievements of Poles over the past 
forty years, without ever mentioning the Communist Party or communist 
rule. 
The slogan of the 1991 campaign was "It Can't Be Like This Any 
Longer."15 But, as Cimoszewicz had done in his presidential campaign a year 
earlier, SdRP campaigners mentioned social welfare services only as products 
of the future growth of the economy and private industry. They also did not 
advocate special protections for state industries but, rather, called for equal 
treatment of state, private, and cooperative industries. They also did not sup-
port a return to state welfare. 
Other aspects of their program were also purely defensive. They avoided 
arguments about communism and used the rhetoric of the former Solidarity 
opposition to defend themselves. For instance, instead of criticizing the 
Catholic Church, they stressed the need for "religious freedom" (something 
they had been criticized for denying in the communist era). What they did 
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say was that the state should be separate from the Church. On foreign pol-
icy, they played the "Russian Bear Card," suggesting that Poland was only 
safe if its relations with the Soviet Union were as good as those with the new 
Germany. The platform went on to indicate that Poland was poised to take 
the lead in the newly emerging markets of the former Soviet bloc. Given 
their long connections with the Soviet Union, they hoped to gain from the 
assumption that they were the only ones who had the ties to make this hap-
pen. 16 This also was all they could claim: the West was so heavily invested in 
Solidarity and the ending of communism that the SdRP could make no 
claims in 1991 of even being welcome at the negotiating table with the West. 
In these elections, the SdRP gained again, and PUS essentially disappeared. 
While it did not make any great gains with its 11.8 percent of the vote, the 
SdRP coalition, the SLD, got only slightly fewer votes than the Union of De-
mocracy (UD), the centrist Solidarity group of leaders who had run the first 
Solidarity government. The UD got only 12.31 percent of the vote. This 
meant the social democrats became the second-largest party in the fractured 
Sejm, holding only two fewer seats than the strongest party, the UD. 17 But nei-
ther could truly lead, as the rest of the Sejm was made up of a cacophony of 
tiny right-wing parties that had split off from Solidarity or emerged to oppose 
the "reforms." 
In the 1993 election, the SLD coalition gained again and won 20.41 per-
cent of the vote. But the SdRP got 3 7 .5 percent of the seats in the Sejm ( 1 71 
out of 460) because the former Sejm had set 5 percent of the national vote 
as a minimum requirement for a party to enter the lower house of parliament. 
Right-wing parties were so fragmented that they could not meet this stan-
dard, so more than half of the votes went unrepresented. Support for the SLD 
in the Senate, however, made it clear that the post-communists were popu-
lar in their own right: in the plurality-based votes for the Senate, the coali-
tion won thirty-seven of one hundred seats.18 
This was the beginning of what would be a constant pattern of support. 
The SdRP and SLD retained the supporters they had in the two earlier Sejm 
elections (1989 and 1991) and the 1990 presidential election. Their perma-
nent supporters were concentrated among people with strong ties to the old 
system: former party members, employees of the state sector (educated bu-
reaucrats, administrators, and teachers), and people from the western and 
northern territories (with the exception of Gdansk). These, after all, were 
the areas where communist power had been strengthened by the communists 
having controlled the postwar distribution of German agricultural land and 
where opposition to communism was weakened by the extraordinary losses of 
state farmers in the economic transition. 19 
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But by 1993 the campaign and the party's own self-presentation had 
transformed it into a real "catch-all party." It gained among workers, farm-
ers, and (perhaps most significantly) private owners. Workers were a "gift," 
not a result of any direct appeal. They were the people most hurt by the 
transition. So they voted economic reformers out of office. Even for many 
Solidarity loyalists, the hardships they faced in the new era made the com-
munist past seem better. In addition, the anticlerical stance of the SLD fit 
workers' views: they traditionally were opposed to the Church dominating 
politics. 2° Farmers in this election were the targets of special appeals. The 
SLD campaigned to get them to shift from what had been the communist 
era's special "party" for the peasants, now transformed into the pro-Church 
Polish Peasant Party. 
The result was a geographical concentration of social democratic support 
in the so-called second Poland of small and middle-sized towns where state 
industries had closed and there was high unemployment. These were the 
communities hurt most by the transformation. 21 To them, the SLD offered 
some promise that they would not continue to be marginalized---coalition 
leaders went to these areas to campaign and stressed the "forgotten" Poland 
in their election literature, if not their actual programs. In the process, the 
SLD also made limited inroads among other groups who lived outside the in-
tellectual and Solidarity strongholds of Warsaw, Krakow, and Gdansk. 
In this process, though, the SLD lost some of its support from the "losers" 
of the transformation ( the retirees, white-collar workers, and the unem-
ployed). These groups either did not vote or shifted to the noncommunist 
left (Union of Work) or the populist right. zz In reality, though, the noncom-
munist left was an intellectual organization supported by the "losers" only 
when its candidates ran popular campaigns and got out the local vote. This 
meant those who got elected as Union of Work candidates, the noncommu-
nist left, saw it as their personal victory, not the victory of the party or its 
ideas. 
The SLD got its final boost to control the parliament from the strength of 
its coalition partner, the Peasant Party. It had been "born again" after 1989 
(from its former pro-communist status) to support the Catholic Church and 
private farming, so it appealed to another sector of the population. Its over-
whelming support among peasants resulted in it getting 15.4 percent of the 
total vote and 28.6 percent ( 131) of the seats in the Sejm. 
For all of these gains, however, the SLD remained weak in key areas: 
youth, religious people, and the heart of Solidarity country. 23 It was these 
voids and the sense that women could be a key component of their con-
stituency that would shape SdRP and SLD strategy in their next elections. 
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The broad strength of the SLD continued, even expanded, in the 1995 
election for president. The number of voters who actually voted for Alek-
sander Kwasniewski in the first round (35.1 percent) was more than double 
the number who voted fo r Solidarity candidates in 1993 parliamentary elec-
tions. The "left's take" was slightly more than the total first-round support for 
Solidarity hero Lech Wafesa (33. 1 percent) . The difference looked even 
more dramatic when the other two left-leaning candidates (Tadeusz Zie lirnki, 
supported by Union of Work, who got 3.5 percent, and Jacek Kuron, from 
Solidarity's old leadership, with 9.2 percent) were out of the running in the 
second round. Then Kwasniewski , fac ing only Waf esa in the second round, 
got 51. 7 percent in comparison to Waf esa's 48.3 percent. 24 
In the first round, Kwasniewski did best among those in their forties who 
knew only the failing years of communist rule (3 7 .8 percent as opposed to 
Wafesa's 30.6 percent) ; from small and middle-s ized cities of the "second 
Poland" (36. 7 percent as opposed to 31.9 percent fo r Waf esa); with h igh 
school (35.9 percent) or higher education (30.2 percent as opposed to 25 
percent for Waf esa and 19 percent for Jacek Kurori., the Union of Democracy 
candidate ); in groups whose jobs were based in the old communist power and 
welfare state, such as the police, army, and securi ty services (64.8 percent as 
opposed to 16.2 percent for Wafesa), office workers (3 7.4 to 28.8 percent), 
and managers of enterprises (38.8 to 28.8 percent) . Ironically, two years after 
the social democrats had taken over the government, the social democratic 
candidate also did well among the unemployed (38 to 28 percent) even 
though unemployment had continued to rise. In all other categories, the vote 
was almost evenly split in the first round between Wafesa and Kwasniewski. 25 
Once the other candidates were removed, the election was portrayed, by 
the right, as a choice between Solidarity and the communists. In part, the 
ga ins Kwasniewski made were the result of his emphas is on being rational 
and middle class-not communist-whereas Waf esa came to be seen as un-
predictable and irrational. 26 Much of the shift to Kwasniewski happened as a 
result of the right 's raging about communism being a serious threat while the 
communists held to the moderate center. The right coupled this raging about 
the evils of communism with calls for a return to the social welfare that had 
been provided under communism. By then , all this was truly counterproduc-
tive. SLD politicians had gotten so much public respect that, even if the pub-
lic still thought communism was bad, the SLD seemed not only fa r from that 
past but also comparatively more sane and rational than those who were not 
"tainted" by communist pasts. 
Kwasniewski gained in the second round among eigh teen- to twenty-
nine-year-olds but lost support from those over fifty. He continued to hold 
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small and middle-sized towns and, marginally, held his plurality in villages, 
but he remained almost 10 percent behind Wal'esa in major cities and in-
dustrial centers where the ethos of Solidarity was strong. His greatest support, 
of course, came from those associated with the old regime: enterprise man-
agers, peasants, the military, and the police. Wal'esa did better among spe-
cialists and professionals, private owners, retirees, and housewives. 27 Ironi-
cally, given the support Kwasniewski got from the unemployed (59.6 to 40.4 
percent), he got less support among the least and the most educated than 
Wal'esa did. 
In the second round, Kwasniewski picked up voters from the Peasant Party 
(67 percent of those who voted for Waldemar Pawlak in the first round); the 
Union of Work candidate (66 percent ofTadeusz Zielinski's voters); and vot-
ers who voted in the first round for Andrzej Lepper, the radical, anti-system 
candidate. In addition, 58 percent of those who had not voted in the first 
round and went to vote in the second round voted for him against Wal'esa.28 
With these two victories, the SLD had become the first Polish party or 
coalition in the post-communist period to win two successive elections rather 
than winning one and being thrown out in the next. After Kwasniewski's pres-
idential victory, the party also made major inroads in the local government 
elections. 
Then, in 1997, although the SLD increased its share of voters, it lost its 
hold on parliament. Its proportion of the vote went from 20.4 percent in 
1993 to 27.13 percent in 1997. "Second Poland" was still its stronghold; 
but, in the face of a troubled right-wing coalition, the SLD "caught" voters 
from even more groups. It gained among small businessmen and retirees 
(even though there were two parties explicitly for retirees) and also among 
the religious. Among its target groups, women and youth, the SLD im-
proved but not as significantly. Even though the Solidarity Election Action 
coalition (Akcja Wyborcza "Solidarnosc" [AWS]), the right-wing coalition 
claimed Solidarity as its heritage, 18 percent of the SLD electorate in 1997 
had been members of the original Solidarity trade-union movement in 
1980.29 
What ended the SLD's control of the government in 1997 was the frag-
mented right's decision to form a coalition essentially against the SLD and 
its Peasant Party partner's self-destruction. Rather than face certain defeat 
as little parties that again could not make the requisite 5 percent voting 
requirement, the parties on the right papered over their differences before 
the election to form the AWS. That coalition won 33.83 percent to the 
SLD's 2 7 .1 percent, even though its members fought publicly to come up 
with even a minimal platform that went beyond calls for punishing the 
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communists and returning to "Polish ways." At the same time, the Peas-
ant Party lost most of its support and went from 15 .4 percent to 7 .31 per-
cent.Jo 
Even with the right wing's strength and the losses of the Peasant Party, the 
final defeat of the SLD remained a product of its history: no post-communist 
party would join with "former communists" in a coalition, no matter how 
close their policy interests were. The noncommunist left party, the Union of 
Work, although it had prominent leaders who had been Communist Party 
members, insisted on running on its own rather than join in a coalition with 
the tainted SLD. On its own, though, it got only 4. 74 percent of the vote 
rather than the requisite 5 percent to get seats in the Sejm. Then the cen-
trist intellectual party that had come out of Solidarity, the Union of Democ-
racy, got 13.4 percent of the vote--enough to form a viable governing coali-
tion with either side.JI It refused to consider joining a coalition with 
"communists" even though it had more in common with the SLD than it did 
with the AWS, which railed against the very economic reform the UD (and 
the SLD) had championed. 
That the SLD was not on a real decline became clear in the October 2000 
presidential race. Aleksander Kwasniewski was assumed to be the winner 
from the start. As a result, he did not really have to campaign as anything 
more than Poland's successful president. No other party could put up a can-
didate who could come near him. In the first round, Kwasniewski got 53.9 
percent of the vote to independent candidate (and former communist) An-
drzej Olechowski's 17 .3 percent and Solidarity alliance leader Marian Krzak-
lewski's 15.6 percent.J2 
In the October 2001 parliamentary election, the victory of the newly 
formed SLD party, Alliance of the Democratic left ( discussed below), was also 
assumed from the start. The centrist-based Union of Freedom, the Peasant 
Party, and the SLD were the only parties from the past that ran in this elec-
tion. The Union of Work joined in a coalition with the new SLD party when 
faced with the latter's overwhelming popularity well before the election and 
its own lack of resources to mount a campaign. The AWS ruling coalition es-
sentially admitted defeat before the campaign began, had groups split off, and 
collapsed ( taking only 5.6 percent of the vote, less than the 7 percent required 
for a coalition). The Union of Freedom, having left the coalition with the 
AWS in 2000 and changed its top leadership, could not stop its downward 
slide into oblivion with this campaign. It got 3.1 percent of the vote, well un-
der the requisite 5 percent.JJ What emerged in its stead were issue parties that 
focused on either the marginal fame of their founders or the pull of a single, 
stark message.J4 
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The SLD, in this melee, truly proved itself to be a catchall party with sup-
port coming from all groups: the gainers and the losers of the transformation, 
old and young, men and women, and urban and rural dwellers. The AWS 
coalition's policies had been so disastrous that it lost most of its supporters, 
and the SLD was able to get support simply by running "against" the last four 
years. Although the party was strongest in districts where it had been suc-
cessful before, loyal Solidarity districts essentially disappeared. Every group, 
everywhere, except among the very religious, had a significant portion of its 
electorate vote for the SLD.35 
The Crucible of Rejection: 
Building a Winning Party under Assault 
From the start, the SdRP, ideologically and organizationally, was a product of 
its rejection by everyone else in the new political elite. Its communist pre-
decessor had controlled not only the coercive apparatus of the state but also 
all the jobs and material rewards. As a result, it had been able to block al-
most all criticism of it or its policies. So, when its successors found them-
selves without their usual hold on power and subject to personal and media 
criticism, the sense of being a pariah was overwhelming. 
Even when they were elected in democratic elections, individual deputies 
were shunned by their colleagues. There were no parties other than their old 
albeit now reformed ally, the Peasant Party, that would even consider joining 
them in a coalition. For the communists and, as a result of their continued 
presence on the political stage, for the other parties and politicians, this 
meant the past frequently became far more important than issues of eco-
nomic reform or social policy. The successor party's politicians' response to 
this, over the first decade after the fall of communist rule, was to "circle their 
wagons" and create their own social and political world, even as their ulti-
mate goal was clearly to be accepted by noncommunist parties. To make it-
self more palatable, the new Social Democratic Party avoided anything that 
would link it to the communist era, even if this meant eschewing its worker 
constituency. Even without any formal way to hold onto members and hold 
the party together, its elites insisted on looking united but not "controlling" 
as a party and on doing whatever was pragmatic to get the broadest possible 
support. 
The series of losses and affronts that made for its isolation also made be-
ing in the party uncomfortable for some and kept a negative image of the 
party before the public. Ultimately, however, the attacks and the isolation 
helped the party to create a new and respected persona. Poles came to see the 
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social democrats as professionals who could run the government better than 
anyone else-in part because they were excluded from the great policy and 
personal battles of the early nineties.36 
The successor social democrats were not only defeated but also stripped of 
their old resources. This was so despite the concessions the PZPR had received 
in the roundtable agreements as well as after its initial defeat in the June 1989 
elections: its leader, Wojciech Jaruzelski, was made president; party leaders got 
three major positions in the postelection cabinet; and party members or peo-
ple who owed their original appointments to the party were not formally re-
moved as they were in Czechoslovakia and East Germany. The reality, 
though, was that there was one assault after the other against the new SdRP 
in the next three years. Even after the SLD won power and became popular, 
its earlier rejection remained a decisive factor in all its decisions. 
From the start, even if they did well in elections, SLD politicians simply 
could not win the battle to be included and respected. Once in parliament in 
1991, the SdRP/SLD deputies, already a significant force in supporting the 
reforms, were ignored in debates and coalitions in what was a highly frag-
mented Sejm, with its loud set of eight small right-wing parties among the 
seventeen parties that won seats. Even former friends would walk away rather 
than sit next to SLD deputies in the parliamentary dining room or lounges. 
This left the social democrats no choice but to socialize and work almost 
exclusively with each other. Under the leadership of Aleksander 
Kwasniewski, the party's Sejm offices became virtually "a home away from 
home." There, relations were convivial. Social democratic deputies tight-
ened their social bonds of "us" against the "them" who were shunning them. 
In the process, a clear and visceral sense of the importance of "the party" de-
veloped. 37 This tight loyalty and sense of a group identity, as well as the unity 
of the top leadership group that emerged, would define the party for at least 
the next decade. 
At the same time, consciously or unconsciously, they developed other 
strategies to "cope" with their isolation. These became such a part of the new 
organizational and institutional model of the Social Democratic Party and its 
SLD electoral coalition that they continued to define it even after the isola-
tion ended. 38 One strategy was to focus on organization and infrastructure by 
using what the party retained of the PZPR's resources and also by depending 
on their parliamentary deputies' resources as their new party "base." The sec-
ond was to be the "professionals" in politics who did not debate and fight 
over procedure or grand issues but, rather, focused on making things work. 
The third was to do all they could to be a "catchall" party that represented 
"the nation" rather than any particular group or issue. 
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The focus on organization and on using parliamentary offices as party of-
fices was also necessitated by attacks from outside against the resources the 
SdRP inherited from the PZPR. Beginning in 1990, the right insisted that 
anything inherited from the PZPR was the product of "ill-gotten gains." Most 
of their former buildings, accounts, and equipment were confiscated or 
threatened with confiscation. So the only resources the SdRP had that were 
safe from confiscation were state funds allotted to Sejm deputies. The SdRP 
deputies used these funds for offices, staff, and equipment in the Sejm and in 
their districts. In addition, they used their allotments to meet with their con-
stituents. Their individual offices usually doubled as party headquarters and 
were stocked with communications equipment. When they could, deputies 
opened district offices in the unconfiscated and least visible buildings of the 
old Communist Party, thereby protecting them from confiscation. 
The party did have some other monies and resources. These included in-
dividual members' dues, funds from foundations formed by West European 
social democratic parties, and "businesses" created by party leaders with 
monies they could access.39 Whether or not this gave it more assets than the 
new noncommunist parties got in 1989 and 1990 from their early supporters 
and Western funders, the SdRP ended up with a much better infrastructure. 
SdRP leaders, from their training in the Communist Party, saw infrastructure 
as crucial and made the choice to invest in it as a first priority. Beyond this, 
they used the PZPR membership lists to find contacts among now displaced 
former communist workers and activists to serve as "free" labor in the new 
social democratic district offices and campaigns. 
The other parties that emerged in 1989, on the other hand, had gotten the 
idea that "glitzy" campaigns were the avenue to victory. Western advice 
along with their victories in 1989 and 1990 seemed to prove that they won 
voter support largely because they opposed communism and led the changes. 
By 1991 and 1993, however, when they fought each other rather than "the 
communist enemy," it became clear they also needed offices, phones, and 
faxes . But by then the cost of equipment and office space had risen so much 
and most salaries had dropped so far that there was no money to buy them. 
So, although they had parliamentary allocations and state electoral funds, 
the new parties were left emphasizing what they could afford: campaigns 
rather than local offices. 
The attacks on "communists" meant few newcomers joined the SdRP. In-
stead of looking for new members, it depended on those who had worked in 
the PZPR bureaucracy or as local activists. For them, public attacks on the 
"communists" made the SdRP their only possible haven. The politics of or-
ganization and loyalty were all they knew. So the SLD and its SdRP got a 
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cost-free cadre of people to do the legwork of putting leaflets under doors, or-
ganizing voter meetings, and marching for candidates. This was supple-
mented by the once "communist" trade union, the OPZZ. It mobilized its 
members for demonstrations and other actions. In short, voters saw the SdRP 
as a permanent and accessible presence in the community, not a temporary 
phenomenon focused on getting out the vote so its leaders and deputies 
could live in the capital.40 
In addition, the unwillingness of deputies from any of the other parties or 
coalitions in the 1991 parliament to do anything with those connected to 
the SdRP and its coalition partners kept the social democrats out of what 
were bitter and public ideological and personal battles within the Solidarity 
grouping. These attacks and battles dominated the headlines and lowered 
the prestige of the other parties. Because SLD deputies were unwelcome in the 
backroom negotiations, public debates, and fragile coalitions that were the key 
to parliamentary life in the Sejm (but not particularly popular with the pop-
ulation), they took the only three roles left for them: (1) "detail people," pro-
fessional legislators who reviewed legislation and made corrections so laws 
would actually work; (2) "links" between their regions and the national gov-
ernment; and (3) "advocates" for their districts. By default, the social demo-
crats were seen as the ones making things work better in practical and non-
ideological ways and advocating on behalf of individuals feeling the brunt of 
the economic reforms. 
This gave them ways to look like they "fit" in the new system. Ironi-
cally, even among the deputies who shunned them, the focus on being 
practical and professional wore down their negative images. It seemed to 
voters that these were the men and women who cared about the public's 
needs and could get things done. By the end of the term, research showed 
SLD deputies were, on the whole, perceived as the most effective legisla-
tors both by the public and by other deputies in the Sejm. This would re-
main the case even as the Sejm and its deputies as a whole declined in 
general public esteem.41 
The final strategy was to do everything not to be "communist." This 
strategy was triggered, as were the party's organizational decisions, by the 
social democrats' isolation within parliament, the pervasive sense that 
"communism was dead," and ongoing and escalating attacks on the former 
communists' real and presumed resources . The strategy went far beyond 
their willingness to vote for drastic political and economic transformation 
measures. It involved not reaching out to appeal to their old constituen-
cies: the workers and state employees ( even the former Communist Party 
workers were immediately hurt by the reforms). In their image making, 
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even the few party leaders from the working class made no effort to look 
"working class."42 Instead, they presented themselves as successful , middle 
class, and entrepreneurial. 
When the right-wing parliament fe ll apart, Lech Wat'esa called new elec-
tions only a year and a half after the 1991 elections. The increasing popular 
disgust of many groups with the new politics and economics of Poland 
opened the door for the SdRP to mobilize supporters by being far more ex-
plicitly antireform in its platform for the 1993 parliamentary elections. The 
formulation of that platform, however, was constrained by the interest of the 
party leaders in being accepted by their peers as well as by the ability of a sig-
nificant group of former PZPR and state officials to make money in the pri-
vatization game.43 Hence the decision not to play on the anger of most Poles 
over the losses they had suffered as a result of "shock therapy." 
The leaders' goal was, first and foremost, for the SdRP and the SLD to be 
welcomed into "normal" political coalitions and not treated as evil pariahs.44 
This crystallized in the drafting of the 1993 platform: the word workers dis-
appeared from the text . The real losers from the reforms (retirees, single 
mothers, and the unemployed) and their plight were not mentioned. Instead, 
a new, blanket phrase was coined, "the people who work." The program fo-
cused on how there should be social support and also state money for the 
needs of the middle class: higher education, academic and sc ientific research, 
and culture. It made no explicit mention of the basics of free education, 
health care, unemployment support, and increases in welfare and pensions.45 
In dealing with the communist period, the 1993 platform's response was 
essentially a criticism of governance during the first three years after the 
communists handed over power. It virtually mirrored the right's criticism of 
the communist period and stressed the SdRP's ability to defend all Poles' in-
terests: 
Currently, the politics in Poland is . . . directly tied to "strong armed" and dic-
tatorial attempts to direct social change and public opinion. It does not have 
to be like this any longer. The S.L.D., standing as a political structure to inte-
grate the party, trade unions, social organizations, and people who are not or-
ganized but are tied to social democratic ideals of fa irness and social equality, 
is trying to effectively end the degradation of Poland and develop conditions 
to fill the needs of people who work. At the same time, we are moving to sys-
tematically develop our [national] poli t ical and economic life. This is being 
done by our representatives to parliament, by the Sd.R.P., and O.P.Z.Z. organ-
izations, and also by our leaders in self-gove rnment. In a situation where there 
is an expansion of the right politically, where it controls significan t financial 
resources and has easier access to the mass media, this has not been an easy 
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task. Aggressive attacks on our group and bitter attempts to isolate us in the 
Sejm clearly show their arrogance and prove their lack of respect for the hun-
dreds of thousands of left-leaning voters. These are ineffective attempts to 
force us into resignation ... from responsible and constructive opposition in 
the interests of the nation and the state, to correct the situation of Polish fam-
ilies and guarantee Poland an equal and safe position in Europe and the 
world.46 
Along with this attack on their attackers, the SLD platform focused its 
economic proposals on improving conditions in the new market economy for 
producers as much as, if not more than, for workers. In the process, even 
though they were running beside their Peasant Party allies, they gave farm-
ers as much and even more specific attention than the working class. 
In foreign policy, the SLD focused on the failings of the right both to repre-
sent Poland ·well and to draw together all groups in Poland: "The picture of 
Poland in the world has worsened. We are taken as a country that is sympa-
thetic, capable but weak and unable to solve its problems . .. . It is absolutely 
necessary in our opinion to develop a minimum understanding of all the signif-
icant political groups in Poland as to the aims and directions of its foreign pol-
icy."47 It was the SLD that articulated the need for greater societal involvement 
in foreign policy decisions and for a less ideological foreign policy (again shift-
ing the negative images of the old PZPR to the new rulers' politics). By 1993, 
the SLD actually turned West, supporting Poland's entrance into the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union. Relations 
with the former Soviet Union and its former allies in Eastern Europe fell to the 
bottom of the list of foreign-policy priorities, with merely the mention of the 
need to establish "equal and good relations with our neighbors to the East."48 
Finally, in the critical area of religion and the state, a central issue for the 
right in this campaign, the SLD muted its tone. It made the case for "free-
dom of religion" and for respect of religious rights, without any religion dom-
inating the state.49 Defending women's right to abortions and reaffirming the 
need for academic freedom without Church control were key points. The 
SLD also opposed, in its campaign, the konkordat the government had signed 
with the Vatican. In opposing it, leaders did not frame their opposition in 
terms of an unwillingness to come to a special agreement with the Vatican. 
Instead, they framed it in terms of their support for the principle that secret 
agreements were bad and it was inappropriate to sign agreements giving out-
side powers special authority over issues normally within the purview of the 
Polish government. 
In this campaign, the SdRP and its coalition presented themselves as "pro-
fessional politicians" who did not argue with each other but, rather, worked 
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to serve their communities and provide their expertise in writing legislation. 
They did not present themselves as successors to the Communist Party but, 
instead, as virtually a "catchall party" (with no prior history) that was focused 
on representing "all Poles." Indeed, their program and image were explicitly 
noncommunist. They advocated the West European economic and political 
models as well as ties with the West. The party, in its style and structure, 
looked like the opposite of the traditional Communist Party. It completely 
ceased to speak as a representative or protector of the "workers" and "losers" 
and turned into a party trying to draw support from the "gainers." 
None of this was an accident. In interviews about both their ideological 
stances and their electoral calculations, SdRP leaders focused, in 1993, on 
how they were cleaning up their image, opening doors for coalitions with 
noncommunist parties, and drawing on a much broader constituency than 
they had in the initial post-communist elections. They assumed, no matter 
how far the social democrats deviated from the old communist ideology, old 
party members, some of whom had gained and others of whom had lost from 
the transition, would either not vote or would vote for the social democrats 
simply because they were welcome nowhere else.50 This, they felt, created a 
solid base from which to seek new support and work in the new system. 
From Rejection to Legitimacy 
The SLD won in 1993 not only because of this ideological and organizational 
base but also because of how the right had used its power when in govern-
ment. As the society chafed from losses triggered by the economic reforms, 
the right tried to shift the blame to the "communist" past. In a society that 
had supported the Catholic Church in its opposition to communism but not 
in its teachings about abortion (Poland traditionally had one of the highest 
abortion rates in Europe), the right put through one of the strictest an-
tiabortion laws in Europe. These policies, along with public fights within the 
right and anticommunist attacks from the right just before the election, ben-
efited the SLD. After all, the right's politics made the SLD look eminently 
rational in comparison to what looked like the irrationality of the rest of the 
political world. This, ultimately, delivered the SLD its electoral surge and 
furthered the trajectory of its organizational and political development. 
The passage of a bill, at the very end of the 1992 Sejm session, that barred 
abortions and included criminal penalties for the women and doctors in-
volved also gave the SLD its first opening to do public advocacy and work 
with a noncommunist party. The SLD and the newly formed Union of Work, 
the leftist outgrowth of the Solidarity movement, organized parallel petition 
42 ~ Jane Leftwich Curry 
campaigns to force a referendum on the issue. In the end, that nascent co-
operation failed, but the SLD and the Union of Work, on the local level, had 
found some common ground. While the Union of Work gained in the 
process a public forum to make its name, the SLD got its first opportunity to 
fight visibly "with society" with a group associated with "Solidarity." 
The second and more direct, if inadvertent, assistance the right gave the 
post-communists came from its attempts to pass laws removing communists 
and "secret police agents" from government positions. The minister of inte-
rior also took it upon himself to present to the Sejm a list of politicians who 
were, purportedly, implicated in the secret police files. These included Lech 
Wal'esa and other Solidarity heroes as well as former communists. The pres-
entation of the Macierewicz list resulted in Wal'esa using his presidential 
powers to disband the Sejm and call new elections. But these attempts to 
"decommunize" still culminated in preelection right-wing demonstrations 
against the communists, demanding the "cleansing" of former Communist 
Party members and secret police agents from the government. These took 
place at the very end of the campaign and made headlines. To former com-
munists who had done well in the transition as well as those who had lost 
from the transition, the proposed laws and related moves seemed to be po-
tentially more serious threats than the ongoing and seemingly endless audits 
and court cases over reclaiming the PZPR's old buildings and bank accounts. 
In the end, the right's actions delivered to the SdRP both the old PZPR ap-
paratchiks who had previously not voted for the SdRP because it had be-
trayed the cause and the nomenklatura entrepreneurs who had more in 
common with the reformist Union of Democracy and the Congress of Lib-
eral Democrats than with most of the SdRP/SLD voters. The attacks made it 
clear to both groups that the social democrats were their only protectors. 
With these attacks and the SdRP's response of focusing on disproving 
them by its actions, the model was cemented for what the SLD coalition 
would stand for, how it would present itself, whom it would represent, and 
how it would ultimately govern. It was a model that would hold firm even af-
ter 1999 when the right's attacks decreased and the SdRP dissolved itself, 
transforming its coalition into a party in its own right. 
From its 1993 election victory, and even after it lost control of the Sejm in 
1997, the SdRP and its SLD coalition remained relatively stable not only in 
their ideological stands but also in their voter support, organizational structures 
and goals, leadership, and strategy for electioneering and running the govern-
ment. The goal was to be "establishment politicians" in an electorate divided, 
by its own rhetoric, not on economic grounds but on ideological grounds of re-
ligious versus secular and anticommunist versus pro-communist sentiments.51 
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Basically, the former communists' programmatic options were limited by their 
fear of being seen as "communist." Even when they were at their most popular, 
this burden continued pushing them ever further into the center. This made 
representation of the particular interests of "losers," seen as linked to the old 
communist "workers' state," seem counterproductive. The refusal of other par-
ties to be tainted by being in coalitions with the SLD exacerbated all this. No 
matter what the social democrats did, they were an anathema to the rest of the 
political elite. 
As the social democrats continued to try to convince other political lead-
ers they were not "communists," their natural constituency of workers and 
people who were surviving in state jobs or on state welfare fell to new right-
wing parties. The latter condemned both the communist rulers for their re-
pression and the first generation of liberal reformers for "shock therapy" and 
the withering of the welfare system. At the same time, they promised there 
would be a return to communist-style social welfare. In the right's never-end-
ing rhetoric, both Solidarity, the once archenemy of the communists, and the 
communists had betrayed the workers. Only these "new parties" on the right 
claimed to have had no responsibility for anything before they emerged: 
these leaders had not done anything in the communist era and had not been 
in the first Sejm to vote for "shock therapy." 
The SdRP's position after 1993 was further complicated by the emer-
gence of the Union of Work, a noncommunist left party. It was a blend of 
leftists from the Solidarity Sejm delegation and former PZPR reformers. 
This group was clear about its support of the losers' needs in the new sys-
tem. It looked back to the promises of the roundtables and to the Scandi-
navian model of social welfare democracy. Its policy plans were far from 
vague and general. They were laid out in detail in its program. It was com-
mitted to rational, nonideological politics to the point that both former 
communists and Solidarity activists were welcomed into the party. But, in 
reality, it was a party of intellectuals for whom consistency, not electoral 
popularity, was critical. 
Thus, although the SdRP and the SLD had the resources the Union of 
Work needed to get established in the electorate in terms of both name 
recognition and an organizational base, leaders of the Union of Work con-
sidered the successor social democrats too centrist, opportunist, and also 
compromised and compromising to be an appropriate coalition partner. 52 As 
a result, the Union of Work, although it did reasonably well in the 1993 elec-
tion, was virtually squeezed out of any positions of power. Only when it did 
not make the necessary 5 percent to have seats in the 1997 election did its 
founding leadership leave and a new, more pragmatic group emerge. 
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From its 1993 victory on, the SLD's position was essentially stabilized. 
True, in the 1997 parliamentary elections it lost control of the government 
even though it gained voters. But as the second-largest party in parliament, 
albeit in opposition, the SLD continued to maintain a high profile even as 
the right continued to attack it. After all, Kwasniewski was elected president 
in 1995 and reelected for a second five-year term in 2000. Then, after it be-
came a party, the SLD got its first real breakthrough in "making it" with Sol-
idarity-based parties. Andrzej Celinski, a Solidarity activist and prominent 
politician in the Union of Democracy, joined the SLD and was instantly pro-
moted to head of the Program Committee. Moreover, just before the Octo-
ber 2001 Sejm elections, the Union of Work, threatened with extinction, 
joined in an electoral and governmental coalition with the SLD. 
In victory and defeat, the SLD kept its public image as a coalition of ra-
tional_ professionals focused on practical issues. Although its base of voter 
support spread far beyond former Communist Party members, its top leader-
ship remained stable. In coalitions, it and its members would do almost any-
thing to hold together. When there were divisions over economic policy be-
tween the OPZZ (the SLD's trade-union partner) and the SdRP leadership, 
coalition deputies voted with the coalition even if they disagreed with the 
policy. And, as is elaborated below, after the SLD's self-transformation from 
coalition to party (which effectively excluded the OPZZ's troublesome pres-
ence), it agreed to form a coalition with the small Union of Work on the lat-
ter's terms. Quantitatively, the Union of Work got far more seats than its 
numbers would have indicated, and, at least in the agreement, it was guar-
anteed a real presence in the government. 
The SLD: From Successor Coalition to Successor Party 
The SdRP formally disbanded in April 1999 when the SLD coalition regis-
tered as a party in its own right. In its new incarnation, membership was only 
on an individual basis, not by groups. The new SLD was essentially a "suc-
cessor party" to the "successor party." The hope was that it would no longer 
have to deal with its communist past and, without group members like the 
OPZZ trade union, that it would be more internally coherent and easier to 
manage.53 In the process of becoming a "successor" to the "successor," it also 
moved back to a more structured and controlled membership. It was no 
longer totally open. Membership, according to the new party's rules, required 
acceptance by the membership "circle" or, if that was not possible, by higher-
level regional organs. Once a member, there were obligations: members were 
expected to "care for the good name of the party, seek out sympathizers and 
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supporters of the party, be involved in the activities of the party, carry out the 
decrees of the party leadership and observe the regulations of the party 
statutes, and pay their party dues."54 Those who had public functions were, 
add itionally, "responsible to the party for their activities."55 In reality little 
changed, given the persistence of that tightly knit cohort created in the hard 
times before its 1993 victory and the disinterest of most Poles in party poli-
tics. What did change was that the SLD leaders simply gave up the pretense 
of internal democracy taken on to disprove their rightist critics. The SLD 
leadership ( of both the old coalition and the new party) continued to run its 
own show, using local and regional offices to deliver votes rather than hav-
ing them be independent forces. Now it had a structure that granted the 
leadership real authority. 
In its program as in its governance, the trajectory of the SLD did not 
change. It continued to move toward increasingly liberal capitalist doctrine 
and further away from any of the pillars of Marxism. So, as a provisional 
member of the Socialist International since 1997, the Polish party stands as 
one of its more centrist parties. 
What changed when the SLD was voted back into power in 2001 was that 
its image as a successful and undivided party of skilled administrators tar-
nished rapidly. So, in spite of warning that it would not be able to reverse the 
decline in the economy and social services immediately, the failure of the 
Polish economy to right itself resulted in divisions in the leadership and a 
dramatic downturn in its popular approval ratings less than six months after 
the SLD formed a new government.56 Beyond this, although the top party 
leaders got posts in the new government and the Peasant Party and Union of 
Work got only a few posts, the new SLD party clearly sought new faces. Few, 
other than the top party leaders and those who controlled economic min-
istries, were from the old cabinet or party leadership. Instead, they were men 
and women in their forties and early fifties who were nonparty professionals 
or SLD experts on various policies-proof for the SLD that they were no 
longer rejected by "establishment politicians." As a result, although there 
were established local leaders who had served in the Sejm or Senate and ran 
large local parties, they were not given cabinet positions. 
What did happen was that the top party leaders, in taking over the key 
ministerial positions (interior, defense, and foreign affairs), lost their tight 
control of the party's day-to-day affairs. Beyond this, once the SLD had no 
real party competitors on the left, right, or center, the pressure for unity de-
creased. The result of all of this and the pressures of a failing economy were 
open splits between President Kwasniewski and Prime Minister Leszek Miller 
and within the cabinet.57 Finally, the economic crisis, the weakness of the 
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peasants, and the pressure put on local and regional leaders-as well as the 
sense that positions in state industries and government posts had been polit-
ical prizes under the previous AWS government and were now the rightful 
bounty of SLD-led to battles in the SLD leadership that had been avoided 
in the 1993-1997 period. 
Leadership 
Throughout the 1990s, at the top levels of the party and its coalition, there 
was little difference between its leaders and those of the rest of Poland's par-
ties. Studies of party elites show that SLD leaders, like the leaders of all of 
Poland's major parties and coalitions in the transition, tended to be middle-
aged (from thirty-five to fifty-five), well educated, and financially successful. 
Almost all were male (in the 1990s, only one woman, Ewa Spychalska, head 
of the OPZZ trade union, was on the Executive Committee). The only fea-
tures that actually differentiated the social democrats and their leaders from 
their counterparts were that they were less likely to go to church and more 
likely to have been members of the PZPR or, at least, not to have been affil-
iated with Solidarity.58 (Although data are not yet available as to the mem-
bership of the new SLD party, it appeared that this would remain the case 
even though, as former party members aged, a past of PZPR membership was 
on the decline.) 
The top SLD leadership differed from other parties basically in its expe-
rience, strength, and continuity. The men at the very top of the SdRP and 
its SLD coalition had been PZPR regional first secretaries (Leszek Miller 
and Josef Oleksy), secondary national government or party officials (Alek-
sander Kwasniewski) in the 1980s, or younger academics (WXodzimierz 
Cimoszewicz). During the twelve years between the collapse of the PZPR 
and the emergence and electoral victory of the "successor to the successor 
party" in 2001, these men rotated the top party, parliamentary, and govern-
mental positions. But no one new entered into this top level. 
Surrounding them initially were men who had been in the PZPR appara-
tus or organs at the end of the communist era. Most came in as candidates 
for election to the early Sejm or as academics. Then, beyond these ten or so 
individuals, there was a number of more established academics and profes-
sionals who sat on the successor organizations' various executive councils or 
were brought in for government positions.59 Where conflict occurred, it was 
almost always at the second level of power, with the women and trade-union 
activists who rose up and held such positions as chair of the women's organ-
ization or the trade union. Their positions as the heads of separate groups 
within the SdRP (in the case of the women's organization) or the SLD coali-
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tion (in the case of OPZZ) marginalized them. They became more marginal-
ized when they remained or were involved in independent advocacy. At this 
second level of party leaders there was really not any significant change un-
til 2001 except that Ewa Spychalska, who led and fought for the OPZZ trade 
union, was sent as ambassador to Belarus. 
Even though there were ideological differences among the top five leaders of 
the party, the sense of the need for unity at the top remained unchanged for the 
first ten years.60 They were, after all, the successor party's de facto decision mak-
ers. Rather than compete for top offices, the SLD top four or five leaders traded 
them. Indeed, their differences, until 2001, were more about the strictness of 
"party line" votes and party ideology issues than about economics. The splits oc-
casionally became partially visible in what were played out as essentially jocular 
discussions within the SLD parliamentary group or in the nuances of their pub-
lic statements.61 Although some outsiders saw the leaders' history of joining and 
working in the party during the martial law period of the early 1980s as a sign 
of their conservative tendencies, none ever came near voicing anything close to 
nee-Leninist positions or defending the virtues of martial law. 
The commitment to consistency and loyalty was quite clear at all levels 
until 2001. Even when Josef Oleksy was accused of having had close relations 
with a Soviet Russian agent and had to resign as prime minister, the SdRP 
did not censure him or distance itself. Instead, it demonstrated its loyalty by 
making him head of the party. Only in the new SLD party did he move from 
visible leadership to de facto leadership. Aleksander Kwasniewski, who 
played a major role in creating the SdRP and its parliamentary community 
both informally and as its chairman, formally left the party when he became 
president. He presented this as a way to "represent all Poles" as president. But 
he continued to be involved with internal party issues behind the scenes. 
Only after 2001, when Poland's economic problems threatened his position 
and that of the party was it clear he was taking a more centrist line and was 
not in full agreement with Leszek Miller. 
The party's attempts to draw new people into its leadership were so marginal 
that when Solidarity activist Andrzej Celirnki, of the Union of Democracy, 
joined the SLD in 1999 it was a major event. He was instantly made head of the 
Platform Committee. Indeed, that was the only formal change in the top lead-
ership circle when the SLD went from being a coalition led by the SdRP to be-
ing a party in 1999. The reality was that there was no real change in the top 
leadership even though the new party rules required that there be a representa-
tive of youth and women's groups in the executive. The two people who were 
brought in were clearly tokens, too young and marginal to have a real role.62 By 
this time, though, a cadre of local leaders had begun to emerge, interested in 
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moving into the top leadership and also in getting the local positions seen as 
having been the "fruits of victory" for the Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stron-
nictwo Ludowe) in 1993-1997 and the AWS after its win in 1997.63 
When the SLD finally was able to form a coalition with a Solidarity-based 
party, the Union of Work, this coalition did not involve any shift in leader-
ship. All the parties agreed to do was work together in the election, form 
joint candidate lists based on their relative size, and develop a common plat-
form. Once in government, although the heads of the Union of Work and 
the Peasant Party were made vice-prime ministers and the Peasant Party was 
also given the two "agricultural" ministries, the Union of Work got no min-
isterial positions. Essentially, Leszek Miller controlled all the appointments 
himself. Indeed, SLD leaders were so accustomed to working together that 
policy was made as often by default by the top leaders as it was by open dis-
cussion. In the process, the cabinet drifted apart and conflicts between eco-
nomic cutbacks and social welfare benefits complicated policy.64 
More important than the backgrounds of the leaders was their public de-
meanor. The SdRP and SLD leaders not only were middle class but, even 
though few had real professional training other than law or extensive experi-
ence in administration, presented themselves as administrative and policy pro-
fessionals. To the public, they stressed their restraint and control, avoid ing 
even in the heat of campaigns relying on "charisma" and rallying the crowds.65 
In negotiations and conflicts, they always acted as though they were at least 
willing to compromise, to forgive partners or potential partners for not coop-
erating, and to take no strong policy stances. When the SdRP was in a gov-
erning coalition with the Peasant Party in 1993, it first made Waldemar 
Pawlak, Peasant Party head, the prime minister, even though the social demo-
crats were the dominant coalition partner. During this entire coalition period 
from 1993 to 1997, the SdRP came through every confrontation looking like 
it had avoided conflict and compromised, while its partners in the Peasant 
Party looked increasingly intransigent and confrontational. Even as the domi-
nant party in the preparation of the new Polish constitution, it sought out the 
participation of the right-wing parties not in parliament, made real compro-
mises on the issue of Catholic influence in the state, and did little to 
strengthen the powers of the presidency. Its leaders were also willing to have a 
national referendum on the constitution rather than appear to push through 
the draft the Sejm had passed against the objections of the right.66 
Party Organization 
The internal structure of the SdRP and the image it projected initially re-
flected the social democrats' desire to disprove those who attacked them as 
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"communists." At the same time, they carried with them a clearer sense than 
anyone else of the need for internal communication and organization. In the 
process of both avoiding any appearance of being communist and following 
the lessons of its past that organization is important, the SdRP developed a 
formal and informal structure. Its informal structure, since 1991, was of an 
elite clustered at the top that ran the party and held the power in the parlia-
mentary group. After the party created a governing coalition in 1993, some 
of these leaders took on a third set of positions, becoming cabinet ministers.67 
Between this small and closed elite group and the membership, there were 
no real links, only formal organizational structures. The actual power of the 
middle and lower levels was limited at best. Even in the national party head-
quarters, the visible staff, including building guards, hovered at less than 
thirty. As long as the wealth of the party was questioned, party leaders did 
everything they could to not look well endowed. Funding came from mem-
bers' dues to the local bodies and from the state allocations that were made 
to each party's parliamentary deputies. Support came as well in "donations" 
of manpower and materials from the OPZZ, other small parties, and special-
interest organizations. Beyond that, the SdRP had a variety of small-scale en-
terprises and endowments structured in ways that their origins were hard to 
trace directly. 
The formal structure of the SdRP was touted as proof that it was not like 
the old Communist Party but, rather, involved relatively autonomous bodies 
at all levels. Membership in all these organizations required no selection or 
candidacy period. All prospective members had to do was fill out a member-
ship card and agree to pay minimal dues to the local organization. 
The top levels of the party were supposed to be directed by party confer-
ences held every two years and congresses held every four. At the conferences 
and congresses, the party delegates, elected with no guidance from the top, 
were supposed to be able to remove party leaders or question and change 
party policy. These congresses then had the formal right to elect a top lead-
ership from among their ranks that included a director and governing coun-
cil to make ongoing decisions. (In reality, at the middle and local levels there 
was so little interest in what happened that no one actually used these 
"rights," and attendance at the congresses and conferences was pro forma: 
delegates listened to top leaders' speeches and engaged in orchestrated dis-
cussions.) 
The top had little real or independent role in this formal structure other 
than to represent the party publicly, based on the conference and congress 
policies, and to serve the needs of party deputies. There certainly was no 
built-in bureaucratic base. Ostensibly, the top had no funds other than those 
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sent up to it by local groups. In reality, of course, the top leaders were a self-
sustaining group with funds from the Sejm allocations and its own "busi-
nesses" as well as local allocations. The lower levels had little contact with 
these leaders and certainly no power over them.68 
The electoral coalition the SdRP formed around itself went even further 
to avoid any sense of party dominance or control. There were never any pub-
lished accords for the electoral alliance. Instead-according to people in the 
national leadership-parties, unions, and social organizations were welcome 
to join, if they wanted, even when they had a history or took positions that 
set them against the SdRP or its predecessor, the PZPR. Indeed, even the rad-
ical group claiming to be from the prewar Polish Socialist Party, which had 
been actively involved in some of the most open and violent resistance to 
communism, was welcomed into the coalition. For the SdRP, the most im-
portant thing was to get legitimacy from having others join it. But, given the 
social pressure against being a part of the "old regime," the groups that joined 
were marginal at best, and there was never any rush to join. 
Once in the alliance, the various groups' leaders went to coalition meet-
ings prior to the elections to propose their own candidates for slots on the 
coalition ticket. They were focused on political action. The SLD coalition 
had no permanent structure or independent resources. The SdRP represen-
tatives on the steering committee had not only a majority of the seats but 
also most of the resources and the only real permanent organization. Ac-
cording to SdRP leaders who were members of the SLD coalition steering 
committee, the various organizations were "given" places on the electoral 
lists based on their size, significance, or importance to the coalition's aims. 
Beyond this, individuals were assigned districts where they were either the 
"locomotives" to draw voters or could be assured of party support even if they 
did not have name recognition. Individual candidates' campaigns were not 
funded by the party or the coalition. Candidates themselves had to front the 
money for the basics of the campaigns. Then, unlike other parties, when the 
SLD got money back from the state based on the size of its "win," it did not 
return the money to any candidates.69 
Of the member organizations in the SLD, of course, the prime organiza-
tion (other than the SdRP) was the OPZZ. It was the communist-era trade 
union formed when Solidarity was forced to disband. It bore the stigma of 
having been imposed to replace the popular, mass-based Solidarity after mar-
tial law was declared in 1981. But, in building on the Solidarity funds it in-
herited and the government's allocations to it, the OPZZ became a major 
force for workers' welfare. By the end of the decade, in spite of its dependence 
on the PZPR for its very birth and initial position, the OPZZ had weaned it-
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self away from the control of the PZPR. In the process, it became a political 
force in itself so that, in the roundtable discussions, OPZZ was a partner to 
the settlement. 70 
After the 1989 elections, the OPZZ found itself in competition with Sol-
idarity for both members and funds on a workplace and national level. It 
billed itself as the trade union that represented the working class, especially 
those that worked in state-owned enterprises. But it and its leaders were not 
welcomed even at the enterprise level into Solidarity meetings or organiza-
tions. They were, though, players in a Tripartite Commission to discuss eco-
nomic policy along with Solidarity, the Ministry of Labor, and representa-
tives of various producers' organizations. In addition, the OPZZ formed its 
own "Movement of Working People," a more Marxist-Leninist, labor-
oriented miniparty that also had candidates and deputies in the coalition. 
The relations between the OPZZ and the SdRP were not easy when the 
coalition was in power. Although not ministers in the government, OPZZ 
leaders were in the SLD parliamentary delegation and were thus involved in 
the decision-making process and in dealing with government experts. As a 
result, their views were closer to those of Solidarity union leaders who had 
the same experiences or who worked with them in the Tripartite Commis-
sion than they were to the more alienated workers they represented. At the 
same time, OPZZ deputies led the union. This meant that OPZZ deputies 
would vote in parliament for the national budget, labor regulations, and 
salary limits that were part of the government's economic program. Then, 
many would walk outside of the Sejm building, talk critically to reporters 
about the SLD's program, and join in demonstrations against that very legis-
lation they had just voted for in the Sejm. This soured relations within the 
SLD enough that the two conjoined organizations drafted a formal agree-
ment in 1996 allowing them to differ but ensuring that the differences would 
be controlled and that the OPZZ would stay in the SLD and not make other 
alignments. For the SLD, this was critical, because the OPZZ provided a 
source of critical campaign "foot soldiers" as well as funds that could not be 
taken away as ill-gotten gains from the communist era. 
By the end of the decade, the ongoing tension was a major reason given 
in internal papers and discussions for the SLD to transform itself from a coali-
tion to a party. Typical of the SdRP's avoidance of conflict, however, this was 
not stated publicly as a reason for the shift; rather, it was attributed to the 
need to comply with the Sejm's new "Law on Parties." That law ruled that 
organizations could not belong to parties and that trade unions could not ac-
tually run in elections. Because the OPZZ had no other options if it was to 
align with a political party, the shift was a safe one. 
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Ideology and Policy 
During their time in government in 1993-1997, the SdRP and SLD became 
much more moderate in their policy positions than they had been even in the 
1993 parliamentary election or the 1995 presidential election. They were ac-
tive public advocates for Polish membership in NATO and for Poland's mem-
bership and cooperation with the European Union. They were also, in their 
platform and actions, committed to privatization and the development of pri-
vatized public services. For them, state subsidies and increases in welfare pro-
visions were basically "nonissues." In areas of religion and social policy, the 
SLD continued to copy the rhetoric of the communist-era opposition's attacks 
on communist rule by calling for "freedom of religion" and also intellectual 
freedom. Their goal was clearly to be seen as modernizers, professionals, and 
rational actors, not as men of the past or ideologues. 71 
In control of the parliament from 1993 to 1997, and with Kwasniewski as 
president from 1995 on, the SLD's policies were little different in substance 
than those of the previous Solidarity-based governments. In power, the SLD 
moved further to the center than its election platform had suggested. It con-
tinued the Balcerowicz Plan free-market reforms with no real changes even 
in their speed. This meant passing legislation that hurt workers and cut back 
on social service funding as well as forcing a number of major state industries 
into bankruptcy. 
Its position as a secular party did not spell real action to repeal laws against 
abortion and for religious education in the schools. Under the SLD coalition, 
the konkordat with the Vatican was ratified even though the SLD had cam-
paigned on how it put the Catholic Church "above the law" by, for instance, 
exempting Church property from state control and making Church weddings 
separate from the civil code. In spite of the SLD's criticism of the antiabor-
tion law passed in 1992, it made no move to repeal or even liberalize the law. 
In the area of Church presence in schools, the SLD minister of education of-
fended the Church by instituting sex education, but he did nothing to end 
required religious education at all levels in state schools. 
In foreign policy, the SLD basically ignored the minor parts of its platform 
that stressed the importance of Poland as a bridge between the states of the for-
mer Soviet Union and the rest of the world. Western support and confidence 
were its priorities beginning in 1993. The SLD government, in fact, took the 
lead in getting Poland into NATO and the European Union, while the right in-
creasingly challenged the encroachment of Western influence and power. 
In the presidential campaign of 199 5 and the parliamentary election of 
1997, the SLD stressed, programmatically, that it had "Kept Its Word" and 
"Today Is Good, Tomorrow Will Be Better."72 In both campaigns, the em-
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phasis was on rational style and the economic gains that would result from 
such "professionalism." The party leaders continued to focus its program on 
promoting a "high-tech" Poland. Public policy, they claimed, was to be fo-
cused not on group interests but on the development of a strong private 
sector with specific government incentives rather than either control or 
subsidies. In the SLD program and electoral statements, the emphasis was 
on how the poor would gain from the "trickle down" of wealth generated 
by increases in technology; the growth of private industry; and the jobs 
generated by the establishment of a housing industry as well as by the ex-
pansion of Poland's infrastructure of roads, transportation facilities, and 
communications links. Indeed, the party promised that taxes would decline 
as the government reduced its involvement in the economy and focused on 
the most significant issues for the "whole society: research, education as 
well as the security of the state and the individual." Again, none of its 
promises responded to the needs of workers or even those state-sector pro-
fessionals who had supported the SLD and the Union of Work. The ulti-
mate goal was to be part of the "Western world" of advanced industry and 
technology. 73 
Ironically, in 1997 the SdRP's stance on its past was more complex than 
previously. Publicly, in its overall program, there was no reference to the SLD 
being an outgrowth of the PZPR. Instead, the SLD traced its ideological 
legacy to the interwar Polish socialist movement. There were acknowledg-
ments that, in the postwar settlement, Soviet control was forced on Poland 
and that excesses occurred in the Stalinist period, followed by periods when 
Poland was the most liberal of the communist states and reformers played as 
strong a role as they could. But the SLD insisted that a large portion of the 
nation, instead of being demeaned by attacks on the past, deserved credit for 
rebuilding and industrializing Poland in the communist era. This assessment, 
however, was written as if it was a historical review almost of someone else's 
past actions. The SLD linked itself and its politicians only to the initiative 
to hold the roundtables.74 Attacks on them for being "communists" were 
characterized as an inappropriate shift of attention away from the gains and 
concerns of the present. 
All the while, SdRP leaders were privately engaged in discussing cam-
paign strategies and holding meetings with other successor social democratic 
parties in such countries as Lithuania and Hungary. These were deliberately 
held out of the public eye. But in private discussions, the people involved 
made it clear that it was important to their strategies that their reformist 
counterparts won electoral victories elsewhere in the former Soviet bloc. 
Aleksander Kwasniewski, while making his initial state visits to the West, 
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did not ignore what happened in Russia and the neighboring Ukraine, but he 
went there as a supporter of Poland's presence in NATO and the European 
Union. 
Although the leaders of the SdRP were always clear that their goal was to 
form coalitions with centrist parties and the noncommunist left party 
(Union of Work), they also wanted to use membership in the Socialist In-
ternational to prove they were not communist but, in fact, were a legitimate 
center-left party. So, in 1996, they fought hard to be Poland's one represen-
tative to the Socialist International. At the same time, this was not some-
thing that they touted in the general media in Poland or that Poles actually 
cared about. In the end, this association of European socialist and social dem-
ocratic parties, including Tony Blair's New Labour Party, Germany's Social 
Democrats, and the French Socialists, recognized both the SdRP and its then 
competitor, the Union of Work, as provisional members in 1997. 
The newly transformed SLD party's victorious campaign platform in 2001 
was marked by a continued move to the center. The move itself was one that 
had been debated since 1999 and was reinforced by public opinion research 
commissioned by the SLD and presented in various party meetings. Al-
though the party promised to help "the poorest," the concepts of class and of 
worker did not appear. Instead, the platform continued to talk about allevi-
ating poverty by the development of business, increasing the strength of 
small and medium industries, and getting Poland into the European Union 
as soon as possible. It emphasized making education accessible without mak-
ing any promises to assist those who could not afford to go to school. The 
past was essentially ignored, although the party platform did mention the 
need to have normal relations with Russia. 75 Two "new" figures in the SLD, 
one a former Solidarity leader and former member of the Freedom Union, 
were assigned to respond to the Catholic Church's attacks on the party as still 
being "communist" by simply denying that connection and saying "the 
Church is an important part of Polish life."76 
The focus of the SLD-Union of Work coalition program was specific. Its 
slogan was "Let's Return to Normalcy-We're Winning the Future." Its focus 
was on the AWS government's poor administration and policy that had hurt 
Poles as well as Poland's economy and position in the world. In tum, the SLD 
emphasized its professionalism by promising that the coalition would work 
together (as opposed to the fractious AWS-Freedom Union coalition) while 
not promising an instant solution to Poland's problems: as head of the coali-
tion, Leszek Miller promised "a competent government and competent coali-
tion."77 The SLD, once closely associated with state welfare and a huge state 
bureaucracy, also promised to cut drastically the government bureaucracy 
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and even the number of ministries (including the AWS "dysfunctional" bu-
reaucrats) and make state administration much sleeker and less costly.78 
After the SLD's first one hundred days in office, the new SLD prime min-
ister, Leszek Miller, reported that his government had made real cuts; gotten 
Poland back on track toward European Union negotiations; and developed a 
less wasteful budget that, while significantly reduced, still provided for the 
poorest segment of the population. 79 In the process, though, his government 
suffered from its experience in 1993-1997 when people had learned to ex-
pect little and got an economic boom: this time what they inherited was an 
economic disaster and a population that expected them to "do it again" and 
bring about a new economic boom. 
Organization Is Everything 
A decade after the first partially free vote in June 1989 came out against 
the communists, the men who had been second-rung leaders of the Polish 
United Workers' Party in the 1980s managed to become the most success-
ful centrist politicians in Poland's otherwise fragmented and fractionalized 
political world. In campaigns and in governing, they appeared as profes-
sionals , taking, at best, vague ideological positions and making no real 
promises. Ironically, the lessons they learned from joining the party just af-
ter the repression of 1968, holding power in the last decade of communist 
rule, and being condemned after the 1989 election ultimately made them 
much better at amassing support and governing in a democracy than the 
politicians who had cut their teeth opposing communism and the men and 
women who came to the fore after communism fell. These groups were 
more ideologically strident and prone to bitter battles than the politicians 
of the successor center left. 
If anything, those who had been in the Communist Party before it fell 
entered politics with a clear sense of the importance of organization and 
coordination. They knew how to do it and had the initial resources, left 
over from the communist era, to do it. The rejection and attacks they ex-
perienced in the aftermath of their first defeat in 1989 gave substance to 
this: it was the crucible that brought them together and created a sense of 
"us" versus "them" that would last more than a decade. This ensured not 
only that the SLD coalition spoke with one, or almost one, clear voice but 
also that its leadership would remain stable in spite of its "open" member-
ship, attacks from the outside, and early setbacks. It was this professional, 
nonconflictual, and consensus-oriented style that corresponded to what a 
majority of Poles evidently wanted from their politicians. 
56 ~ Jane Leftwich Curry 
There was little desire on anyone's part to support "communist ideol-
ogy." The PZPR had been one of the most liberal parties in the Soviet bloc 
during the 1950s and early 1960s. The debacle of the economy's collapse 
and martial law in the early 1980s ultimately strengthened the hand of the 
party's liberals. So, by the end of the 1980s, its leaders had moved far from 
doctrinaire Marxism-Leninism.80 In the face of attacks on the successor 
party's deputies and leaders for being responsible for all that was bad in the 
old system, the men and women who ran the SdRP tried to shield them-
selves by avoiding doing or advocating anything that could be construed as 
"communist." Meanwhile, no one else was willing to risk being tarred as 
"Red" by taking on searing social problems or working with former com-
munists. The ultimate irony of all this was that the rejection the commu-
nists' successors suffered from other politicians determined their platforms, 
not the interests of voters, until the "successor" to the "successor party" 
emerged in 1999. As a result of the incessant anticommunist attacks in the 
1990s, the SdRP always structured political debate and advocacy so as to 
underscore both the fact that it was not communist and the right's inabil-
ity to tolerate or cooperate with anything or anyone it saw as "Red." The 
successors became successes because of the lessons of their party's failure 
and subsequent rejection-they reacted to being unwanted by their politi-
cal peers rather than to any sense that they were representing a social group 
or ideal. 
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